THE SOUTH AFRICAN JURIST’S CAREER ILLUSTRATES THE CHALLENGE OF TURNING INTERNATIONAL NORMS INTO EFFECTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY WITHOUT SUBORDINATING THE LAW TO POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY.
BY NASSER ZAKR
The awarding of the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize to South African jurist Navanethem “Navi” Pillay offers an opportunity to examine one of the central contradictions of contemporary international law: The existence of norms and institutions designed to address the gravest crimes does not, in itself, guarantee their effective application.
The question is not merely whether norms prohibiting genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes exist. The challenge is to understand the extent to which the international system can translate these prohibitions into concrete mechanisms for prevention and accountability, including when the political and strategic interests of powerful states are at stake.
Pillay’s career provides an opportunity to examine this problem through several distinct experiences: The struggle against apartheid, international criminal justice, the protection of human rights and service in international investigative and judicial mechanisms. Her professional trajectory reveals both the possibilities opened up by the development of international law and the difficulties of ensuring its consistent application.
In 1967, Pillay established her own law practice in South Africa’s Natal Province, becoming the first woman to do so in that region. Of Indian Tamil descent, she grew up under apartheid and defended opponents of the regime. In a society marked by institutionalised racial discrimination, the practice of law also represented a form of resistance to arbitrariness and an affirmation of fundamental rights.
In 1995, she was elected a judge of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, where she served for eight years and presided over the Tribunal from 1999 to 2003. In 2003, she joined the International Criminal Court, where she served until 2008, when she assumed the position of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, a role she held until 2014.
One of the landmark cases during her tenure at the Rwanda Tribunal was the trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu. The judgment, delivered in 1998, represented a significant advance in the legal interpretation of genocide. The Tribunal recognised that acts of sexual violence could constitute acts of genocide when the applicable legal requirements were met, including the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.
The significance of the judgment extended beyond the conviction of an individual. The precedent demonstrated that judicial interpretation could clarify the scope of international norms and provide legal recognition to forms of violence whose gravity had not always been adequately reflected in the application of the law.
This experience highlights a fundamental dimension of international justice: its capacity to interpret legal norms and establish standards for their application. Case law does not replace treaties, but it helps clarify the scope of legal obligations and determine the circumstances in which particular conduct may constitute international crimes.
Normative and jurisprudential advances, however, do not in themselves resolve the problem of accountability. Between the legal recognition of a crime and the holding of its perpetrators accountable lies a series of necessary steps: investigating the facts, gathering evidence, establishing responsibility under the applicable standards, ensuring due process and, where a conviction is secured, guaranteeing the enforcement of judicial decisions.
It is precisely in this transition from legal recognition to practical implementation that some of the international system’s most significant limitations become apparent.
The effectiveness of international justice depends, to varying degrees, on state cooperation. In international criminal justice, such cooperation is essential for obtaining evidence, arresting and surrendering accused persons and enforcing sentences. At the International Court of Justice, the issue takes a different form: its judgments are binding on the parties, but their implementation depends on the mechanisms provided for under international law, including those established by the Charter of the United Nations.
These institutional differences reveal a structural tension. International norms establish legal obligations that cannot be equated with the policy preferences of individual governments, yet their practical implementation frequently depends on state cooperation.
This does not mean that international law lacks normative force. The difficulty of enforcing an obligation does not invalidate it, just as political resistance to the application of a norm does not, in itself, extinguish the corresponding legal duty. To accept the contrary would be to concede that international obligations exist only for as long as those bound by them find them convenient.
It is equally important to avoid the opposite mistake: assuming that the existence of a norm or institution is sufficient to guarantee results. The credibility of international justice depends not only on the possibility of establishing accountability, but also on respect for jurisdictional limits, judicial independence, rigorous evaluation of evidence and procedural safeguards.
Pillay’s career also illuminates another dimension of this system: The distinction between individual criminal responsibility and the international responsibility of states.
In 2019, Pillay was appointed an ad hoc judge of the International Court of Justice in the proceedings instituted by The Gambia against Myanmar concerning the application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The dispute concerns Myanmar’s international obligations and its potential responsibility for violations of the Convention, rather than the criminal trial of individuals accused of genocide.
This distinction is essential. The International Criminal Court examines the criminal responsibility of natural persons within the limits of its jurisdiction. The International Court of Justice, by contrast, resolves legal disputes between states. Although both courts can contribute, through different legal avenues, to addressing international atrocities, they have distinct foundations, procedures, and consequences.
Between 2021 and 2025, Pillay also chaired the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel. On 16 September 2025, the Commission concluded that Israel had committed genocide in the Gaza Strip, basing its analysis on acts committed and statements examined in light of the legal elements of the crime.
The conclusion prompted intense international controversy and was rejected by Israel. Its legal nature, however, must be described precisely: it was a finding by a United Nations commission of inquiry, not a judicial judgment establishing the criminal responsibility of individuals or, by itself, resolving a dispute concerning the international responsibility of a state.
This distinction does not diminish the importance of the investigation. International commissions can collect and examine evidence, document violations, and formulate findings relevant to accountability. Their mandates, however, are not equivalent to those of courts, whose proceedings require jurisdiction, established procedures, and the assessment of evidence according to the applicable legal standards.
Precision is particularly important in situations of intense political polarisation. The gravity of the allegations demands rigorous investigation and legal analysis, not the abandonment of legal standards. At the same time, political controversy cannot serve as a justification for ignoring possible violations or setting aside applicable international obligations.
For Brazil, this debate has concrete significance. Defending a rules-based international order requires consistency between the legal commitments undertaken by the state and its diplomatic conduct. Participation in the multilateral system does not end with formal adherence to treaties; it presupposes serious engagement with international obligations and the cooperation mechanisms necessary for their implementation.
This does not mean indiscriminately accepting every conclusion reached by an international body. It means that disagreements must be examined through legal arguments, with due respect for procedural safeguards and institutional mandates. Reasoned criticism is part of the functioning of a legal order; the selective rejection of obligations according to political convenience undermines its credibility.
The 2026 Nobel Peace Prize recognises Navi Pillay’s career in the defence of human rights and the development of international justice. Its significance, however, extends beyond individual recognition. Her career illustrates both the capacity of law to contribute to accountability for grave crimes and the difficulty of ensuring that legal norms are applied consistently.
Lasting peace depends on more than diplomatic agreements or a balance of power among major states. It also requires institutions capable of investigating violations, establishing responsibility, and protecting fundamental guarantees without allowing the application of the law to be determined exclusively by the political standing of those involved.
The contemporary challenge, therefore, is not merely to expand the body of international norms, but to strengthen the institutional conditions necessary for their implementation. This requires cooperation among states, respect for legitimate judicial decisions, and a willingness to recognise that political power does not, in itself, provide grounds for setting aside legal obligations.
The decisive test of international justice is whether the law can be applied consistently even when accountability runs counter to the interests of the most powerful.
Nasser Zakr is a lawyer specialising in international law and human rights. His career includes service with the United Nations and participation in peacekeeping missions and work with international institutions in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas, including the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR/UN). His additional academic studies include programmes at Harvard Kennedy School, the University of Oxford, McGill University’s Faculty of Law, and Georgetown University Law Centre, as well as postgraduate studies at Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.
